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The Penn-Lehman Automated Trading Project
Abstract
The Penn-Lehman Automated Trading Project is a broad investigation of algorithms and strategies for
automated trading in financial markets. The PLAT Project’s centerpiece is the Penn Exchange Simulator
(PXS), a software simulator for automated stock trading that merges automated client orders for shares with
real-world, real-time order data. PXS automatically computes client profits and losses, volumes traded,
simulator and external prices, and other quantities of interest. To test the effectiveness of PXS and of various
trading strategies, we’ve held three formal competitions between automated clients.
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The Penn-Lehman
Automated Trading
Project
Michael Kearns and Luis Ortiz, University of Pennsylvania
The Penn-Lehman Automated Trading Project is a broad investigation of algo-rithms and strategies for automated trading in financial markets. The PLAT Proj-
ect’s centerpiece is the Penn Exchange Simulator (PXS), a software simulator for auto-
mated stock trading that merges automated client orders for shares with real-world,
real-time order data. PXS automatically computes
client profits and losses, volumes traded, simulator
and external prices, and other quantities of interest.
To test the effectiveness of PXS and of various trad-
ing strategies, we’ve held three formal competitions
between automated clients.
PLAT background
The PLAT Project (www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/
projects/plat.html) has several underlying motiva-
tions. From a research perspective, we’re among the
growing number of AI and computer science
researchers with an interest in all forms of e-com-
merce, computational markets, algorithmic mecha-
nism design and electronic auctions, and related top-
ics. In addition to a burgeoning theoretical literature,1
this line of research has a growing platform and sys-
tems component. The best example of such a system
is perhaps the popular, successful Trading Agent
Competition (TAC)2–4 (see also http://auction2.
eecs.umich.edu/researchreport.html), which has fo-
cused primarily on multicommodity auction simu-
lations. So, one primary motivation for the PLAT
Project is to contribute to this line of systems and
competition work in automated markets. In this
regard, a distinguishing characteristic of the project
is its investigation of a real and widely studied class
of automated markets and strategies. Indeed, Wall
Street has many quantitative traders who do for a liv-
ing what PLAT Project participants do in the safety
of the PXS environment. In the same vein, we’re also
interested in designing challenging, realistic com-
petitions in automated trading in financial markets,
using PXS as the testbed.
We also actively use PXS as a platform for devel-
oping novel, principled automated trading strategies
(clients). The real-data, real-time nature of PXS
lets us examine computationally intensive, high-
frequency, high-volume trading strategies (although
this last property always presents the challenges of
estimating the market impact—the effect on prices).
We’re particularly interested in developing clients
that make predictive use of limit order book data,
including those using statistical modeling and
machine learning. We hope that, over time, the proj-
ect will generate a library of clients with varying fea-
tures (trading strategy, volume, frequency, and so on)
that can serve to create realistic simulations with
known properties.
In addition, the project has a major educational com-
ponent. Aside from the project staff team of five (who
oversee PXS maintenance and development, manage
the Island data, and run the competitions), over 30 stu-
dents are developing automated trading strategies for
PXS, and they regularly participate in the competitions.
Many of the students are in joint programs with the
University of Pennsylvania’s Computer and Informa-
tion Science Department and the Wharton School (of
business). These students must undertake a year-long
senior research project; many have chosen to do so as
participants on the PLAT Project developing novel
automated-trading strategies. Several students are from
other universities.
Finally, the PLAT Project is an educational and
institutional partnership between the University of
Pennsylvania and Lehman Brothers’ Proprietary
The PLAT Project has
developed a trading
simulation that merges
automated clients with
real-time, real-world
stock market data.
This simulation has
been used for three
competitions.
Trading Group in New York City, a group of
Wall Street professionals who actively design
and implement a rich, sophisticated collec-
tion of automated-trading strategies. Our
Lehman colleagues have provided invaluable
scientific guidance on the technical design
of PXS and the competitions and have acted
as mentors to the participating students.
Market microstructure
To understand the PLAT Project, as well
as PXS, you need to understand some details
of the underlying mechanics of financial
markets and exchanges. These computational
and transactional details are sometimes
broadly called market microstructure. We
focus on the market microstructure of NAS-
DAQ exchanges and stocks, both for speci-
ficity’s sake and because it’s most directly
related to PXS. However, many of the same
elements appear in other exchanges, includ-
ing the New York Stock Exchange.
Unlike the NYSE, NASDAQ is entirely elec-
tronic. All orders, whether an algorithm or a
person generates them, are sent to NASDAQ via
an electronic interface and order-routing sys-
tem. Also, a computer executes all matches
between buyers and sellers. Another distinc-
tion between the NYSE and NASDAQ is the
degree of distribution. While all transactions
in an NYSE stock must eventually be cleared
through a single firm or individual (known as
the stock’s specialist), NASDAQ lets many firms
and individuals provide markets in NASDAQ
stocks. This environment led to the advent of
Electronic Crossing Networks (also called
Electronic Communication Networks), which
are firms providing essentially independent,
competing markets for NASDAQ stocks. A typ-
ical NASDAQ stock trader will track prices and
activity simultaneously in multiple ECNs. He
or she might either break large orders up over
several of them or prefer certain ECNs for cer-
tain types of transactions, depending on dif-
fering fee structures. Recently, some mergers
and institutional efforts toward consolidation
have occurred, but several large, independent
ECNs still exist, including Island (www.
island.com), Instinet (www.instinet.com), and
Archipelago (www.archipelago.com).
A fundamental distinction in stock trad-
ing is that between a limit order and a mar-
ket order. Suppose we wish to purchase
1,000 shares of Microsoft (whose NASDAQ
ticker symbol is MSFT) stock. In a limit
order, we specify not only the desired vol-
ume but also the desired price. Suppose that
MSFT is trading at roughly $24.07 a share
(see Figure 1), but we only want the 1,000
shares at $24.04 a share or lower. We can
submit a limit order with this specification,
and our order will be automatically placed in
a queue called the buy order book, which is
ordered by price, with the highest offered
unexecuted buy price at the top (often called
the bid). If multiple limit orders have the
same price, they are ordered by arrival time
(with older orders higher in the book). In the
example in Figure 1, our order would be
placed immediately after the extant order for
5,503 shares at $24.04. Although we offer
the same price, this order arrived before ours.
Similarly, a sell order book for sell limit
orders (for instance, we might want to sell
500 shares of MSFT at $24.10 or higher) is
maintained, this time with the lowest sell
price offered (often called the ask).
So, the order books are automatically
sorted from the most competitive limit orders
at the top (high buy prices and low sell
prices) down to less competitive limit orders.
The bid and ask together are sometimes
called the inside market, and the difference
between them is the spread. By definition,
the order books always consist exclusively
of unexecuted orders—they’re queues of
orders waiting for the price to move in their
direction.
How then do orders get executed? By def-
inition, when a market order arrives, it’s im-
mediately matched with the most competi-
tive limit orders on the opposing book. So, a
market order to buy 2,000 shares will be
matched with enough volume on the sell
order book to fill the 2,000 shares. For
instance, for the example in Figure 1, such
an order would be filled by the two limit sell
orders for 500 shares at $24.069, the 500
shares at $24.07, the 200 shares at $24.08,
and then 300 of the 1,981 shares at $24.09.
The remaining 1,681 shares of this last limit
order would remain as the new top of the sell
limit order book. A limit buy order with a
price much higher than the current ask is
effectively a market order. Likewise, a limit
sell order with a price much lower than the
current bid is effectively a market order. For
this reason, some ECNs (including Island)
don’t offer a separate market order mecha-
nism. But conceptually, the two types have
an important difference: a limit order is guar-
anteed price (if executed) but not execution,
whereas a market order is guaranteed execu-
tion but not price (because the books might
change before the order arrives at the
exchange and executes).
In this setting, every market or limit order
arrives atomically and instantaneously—
orders arrive in a strict temporal sequence,
and two orders can never arrive simultane-
ously. This gives rise to the definition of the
exchange’s last price, which is simply the
last price at which the exchange executed an
order. This quantity is what people usually
mean when they casually refer to a stock’s
(ticker) price. The last price might change
more slowly than the order books, especially
in less liquid stocks.
The market microstructure we’ve described
has existed since the dawn of financial mar-
kets, with some variations in the details (for
instance, NYSE specialists have some flex-
ibility in how and when they execute
matches between buyers and sellers). What’s
more recent is the automation of this process
in markets such as NASDAQ. The fundamen-
tal role of ECNs (and PXS) is the comput-
erized maintenance of buy and sell order
books in the offered stocks, automated order
execution, and various other related func-
tionalities (such as withdrawing or changing
unexecuted orders or checking a previously
placed order’s status).
Even more recent than the automation of
market microstructure is the publication of
real-time order book data. The publication of
such data presents intriguing opportunities (it
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MSFT
BUY ORDERS SELL ORDERS
SHARES PRICE
500
6,000
5,000
100
1,100
100
5,000
200
3,294
1,000
3,000
100
5,503
2,100
2,800
24.0620
24.0610
24.0600
24.0600
24.0550
24.0500
24.0500
24.0500
24.0500
24.0500
24.0430
24.0400
24.0400
24.0300
24.0300
SHARES
LAST MATCH TODAY'S ACTIVITY
Price          24.0700
Time     14:57:07.72
Orders             52,983
Volume    10,243,212
PRICE
500
500
500
200
1,981
412
3,000
500
100
2,800
5,000
1,000
5,000
400
1,000
24.0690
24.0690
24.0700
24.0800
24.0900
24.0900
24.0980
24.1000
24.1200
24.1400
24.1400
24.1400
24.1500
24.1600
24.1700
Figure 1. A typical order book for an 
electronic crossing network.
has also spawned a relatively new literature
attempting to come to both a theoretical and
empirical understanding of order book behav-
ior5,6). This is because the limit order books
can be viewed as an expression of market sen-
timent and, more prosaically, might provide
strategic guidance for order placement. Indeed,
Wall Street traders commonly examine the
limit order books carefully and place their
orders accordingly (for instance, by “stepping
in front” of an existing limit order in the book
by just a fractional amount).
The availability of order book data makes
PXS possible. More specifically, Island is a
major ECN for NASDAQ stocks, accounting
for approximately one of every seven NAS-
DAQ trades. It’s thus among the most impor-
tant providers of liquidity in NASDAQ, and
like many ECNs, it’s a technologically
sophisticated company. Besides accepting
orders arriving through a variety of standard
Wall Street brokerage order-routing systems,
it provides an API for automated order
placement and management.
The Penn Exchange Simulator
PXS is basically an experimental ECN that
merges limit order data from two sources:
actively connected trading clients and limit
orders from Island. We obtain the Island data
in real time from Island’s live Web-based
BookViewer, which shows the top 15 limit
orders (price and volume) in the buy and sell
order books. (Because BookViewer shows
only the top 15 orders rather than the entire
books, accurate maintenance of the PXS
books involves some technical challenges. We
discuss these challenges in an expanded ver-
sion of this article, available at www.cis.
upenn.edu/~mkearns/papers/plat.pdf.)
PXS simulations run in one of two modes.
Live mode updates the Island data in real
time from BookViewer approximately every
three seconds. Historical mode requires that
the requested day of Island data has already
been archived. Live simulations provide the
most realistic merging of the Island and PXS
markets because they’re faithful to the timing
details of activity on Island. Historical sim-
ulations are considerably faster because PXS
can process each update of Island data at its
own internal processing rate.
Every major Wall Street brokerage has
multiple platforms and data sources on which
to test new trading strategies; these are often
called backtesting environments. To date,
most or possibly all backtesting environments
employ either price information alone or, in
some cases, price and inside-market data. This
is almost certainly because order book data has
been widely available for NASDAQ only very
recently (and is still not yet available in many
major markets).
One major advantage of an order-based
simulation platform such as PXS is that it
obviates the need for a fill or execution
model. When only price information is avail-
able for a stock, and a proposed strategy
wishes to place a limit order away from the
current price, any simulation must make a
decision about whether such an order will
execute at a future time based on only that
information. Obviously, if the price never
reaches the limit order price, the order will
never get filled. But, if the price does cross
the limit order price, it might or might not
have executed in the real market, depending
on the depth of demand in the books at that
price. A typical fill model might probabilis-
tically execute the limit order on the basis of
the historical data and the order’s volume.
Just as in real exchanges, PXS fills a limit
order only if an opposing order matches it at
some point in the book-based simulation.
Rather than modeling the depth at different
price levels in the books, we have the books
themselves. To our knowledge, PXS is the
first simulation tool employing real-world
order book data in this manner.
We implemented PXS in C on Unix and
Linux platforms. When it’s invoked, it takes
these arguments:
• The four-letter ticker symbol of the Island-
traded NASDAQ stock for which to run a
simulation (such as MSFT).
• The port number over which PXS will
communicate with trading clients.
• For historical simulations, the date for which
the simulation should run. If this argument
is omitted, PXS executes a live simulation
using the current day’s Island data.
• For the trading day being simulated
(whether live or historical), the simula-
tion’s start and stop times.
For example, the command
pxs -p 9800 -n MSFT -h 04292003093000 -e 160000
starts an execution of PXS on Island MSFT
order book data from 29 April 2003 at 9:30
am and terminates with an Island update close
to 4 pm on that day. This execution would
then accept connections from trading clients
over port 9800. The same command without
the -h argument immediately starts the simu-
lation, using the current Island MSFT data.
The client API
Once a PXS simulation is under way, any
number of automated trading clients may
join at any time by connecting via the desig-
nated port. To each connecting client, PXS
assigns a client identifier.
The PXS client API contains a rich set of
data structures and functions that permit the
placement and withdrawal of orders in the
PXS market, and the computation of certain
market information. Technically speaking,
the functionality we discuss here is split
between PXS and a client shell process inside
which participants implement their trading
strategies. Generally, PXS computes quanti-
ties of global interest to the simulation, while
the client shell computes more client-specific
quantities. For simplicity, we’ll blur this dis-
tinction and simply refer to PXS.
The most basic client API functions are for
order placement and management:
• buyOrder(p, v) places a limit buy order at
price p for v shares. It returns an identify-
ing number for the order.
• sellOrder(p, v) places a limit sell order at
price p for v shares. It returns an identify-
ing number for the order.
• withdraw(o) withdraws the order with the
identifier o from the PXS order books. This
will fail if the order already has executed.
Some functions compute these agent-
specific quantities of interest:
• The clients’current cash and share holdings
• The clients’ current profit and loss, under
either the PXS or Island last-price valua-
tion for share holdings
• The volume of orders outstanding in the
PXS buy and sell books for the client
Some functions provide information about
the overall PXS market state:
• The last price of the PXS or Island markets.
• The current time according to PXS. For live
simulations, this will always be close to the
actual (wall clock) time. For historical sim-
ulations, it will be the time stamp of the
most recently processed Island update.
• The total volume of shares and number of
orders in the PXS buy and sell order books.
• The total volume and number of orders that
PXS has already matched in the simulation.
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• Various statistics of the PXS order books,
including volume-weighted average prices.
More generally, clients can receive a copy
of the entire PXS order book data structure.
This copy shows the price and volume of every
limit order in the book, with indications of
which orders came from Island and which from
PXS clients. So, PXS provides clients with a
level of internal market visibility that matches
that offered on real ECNs such as Island. This
lets PXS clients exploit market microstructure
data at different levels of sophistication.
The execution engine
At the heart of PXS is the execution en-
gine, which
• Maintains the PXS order books
• Integrates Island client buy and sell limit
orders into these books
• Executes matching orders of PXS clients
• Computes PXS clients’ share position,
cash holdings, and profit and loss
A detailed description of the PXS execu-
tion engine is beyond this article’s scope; for
more information, see the expanded article
at www.cis.upenn.edu/~mkearns/papers/plat.
pdf. Here we simply give an overview and
explain some of the engine’s subtle aspects.
At a high level, the execution engine con-
sists of five steps that execute repeatedly
throughout a simulation:
1. Update the PXS buy and sell order books
with any new orders detected on Island.
2. “Clean” the PXS books after the
updates, to address our partial observ-
ability of the Island books.
3. Execute the PXS orders that are
matched by executions on Island be-
tween updates.
4. Execute matches between buy and sell
orders in the PXS books; update the PXS
last price; and update client share posi-
tions, cash holdings, and profit and losses.
5. Insert the newly arrived client orders
into the PXS books.
The valuation of holdings
In any PXS simulation, all PXS clients
begin with no cash and no shares of the stock
being traded. At any time, a PXS client can
buy or sell shares, regardless of its current
share and cash holdings. So, clients can sell
more shares than they hold (selling short) or
buy shares without cash. Share and cash hold-
ings might thus be either positive or negative.
PXS maintains these holdings for each client.
The valuation (profit and loss) of a client’s
holdings at any time is the sum of its cash
balance (positive or negative) and its share
position (positive or negative) times the
stock’s current (last) price. Thus, PSX makes
an important “infinite liquidity” assumption:
at any moment, any client could return its
share position to zero instantaneously by
placing all held shares on the market and
receive the current price for all of them. For
large share positions, this assumption is
clearly unrealistic, because the immediate
attempt to buy or sell large numbers of shares
will move the price unfavorably. Further-
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Dependability characterizes the set of properties of a system thatlets us trust that the system will behave according to its re-quirements. Dependable systems are deployed in critical appli-
cations such as defense, transportation, energy, process control, and
finance. When systems are designed to withstand malicious behav-
ior, we sometimes refer to them as survivable, to emphasize that they
must be dependable even when under attack. To assure these sys-
tems’ dependability, they’re often built using very conservative prin-
ciples that allow extensive validation throughout the life cycle. For
example, you’d expect such systems to use well-tried and reliable
(albeit slow) hardware or conservative programming practices such as
no memory allocation from the heap to ensure that the computation
can be predictably within the bounds of what the hardware can sup-
port. Other methods include building systems with enough security,
diversity, and redundancy to be able to withstand random or mali-
cious stresses; building systems using self-checking and self-repairing
technology; or combinations of approaches.
Is it then ever possible to build a dependable system using agent technol-
ogy? Can the (by its nature) nondeterministic and evolving agent com-
putation paradigm be predictable enough to deploy in time-critical or
other critical applications? Is the concept of emergent properties funda-
mentally at odds with the requirements for dependable software? Even if
we can build a dependable agent system, would we ever be able to pro-
duce a convincing argument to that effect? Paradoxically, the very nature
of agent systems might supply enough diversity and redundancy to satis-
fy dependability constraints. This special issue will explore the interplay
between the need for guarantees and the need for flexible, agent-based
computations.
Topics of interest include but are not limited to
■ Specifying agent system requirements
■ Formal modeling of agent systems
■ Model-based approaches to building dependable agent systems
■ Complexity analysis of agent computations
■ Testing of agent systems
■ Verification of agent systems
■ Assurance of agent systems through risk
analysis and decision management
■ Survivability arguments and dependability
cases for agent systems
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more, there’s the choice of whether to use the
Island or PXS last price to compute the val-
uation of share positions. PXS computes the
valuations both ways. We further discuss val-
uation in the next section.
The competitions
Although PXS can perform simulations
for any stock traded on Island (which
includes all of NASDAQ), all three competi-
tions involved Microsoft stock. Besides the
students from the University of Pennsylva-
nia, two teams from the University of Texas
at Austin and one from Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity have participated.
An issue common to all the competitions
was risk management. Just as on Wall Street,
it’s important to encourage teams to develop
strategies that intelligently balance their risk
and return. In the project’s setting, risk gener-
ally comes in the form of large share positions
(long or short), which, as we mentioned
before, are extremely vulnerable to unfavor-
able changes in the share price. So far, the
project has focused exclusively on intraday
trading; the competitions “cash out” each
client at each day’s end, with no positions held
overnight. From this perspective, an ideal
strategy would end each day with large cash
holdings and a zero or small share position.
We wanted to prevent the results from
being dominated by strategies that simply
place large bets in the form of excessive share
positions. So, all the competitions had the
firm rule that, during any trading day, a
client’s share position must always remain
within a window of ±100,000 shares. Viola-
tion of this was grounds for disqualification.
We forgave minor infractions, but such a dis-
missal occurred in one of the early competi-
tions. This limit is a crude and easily verifi-
able way of ensuring that no client succeeds
simply by taking much larger positions than
all the others. Because (at the time of the
competitions) MSFT traded at roughly $25
a share, the share position limit effectively
meant that clients would never have more
than approximately $2.5 million of virtual
capital at risk.
Another issue common to all the compe-
titions was how to value a client’s share posi-
tion at the end of each trading day. When the
PXS market closes, each client will gener-
ally have a positive or negative cash position
(the balance of the cash it spent on purchas-
ing shares throughout the day and the cash it
received on sales). It will also have a long or
short balance of MSFT shares. To convert
this portfolio to a cash valuation, we must
assign a value to the share position.
For large share positions, simply taking
the share position and multiplying it by the
stock’s last price is unrealistically optimistic.
This is because the placement of a market
order for a large number of shares might eat
deep into the limit order books, resulting in
progressively less favorable prices. This is
the well-known, difficult problem of assess-
ing the market impact of large orders. It’s
also why accurate measurement of strategy
performance from historical data is difficult
and why brokerages almost always break
large orders into small increments over time.
The presence of other trading clients in the
PXS market can act as an important simula-
tor of market impact (a topic we’ll return to).
However, for the purposes of day-end valua-
tion, we do indeed make a somewhat unreal-
istic “infinite liquidity” assumption and value
every client’s share position at the last price.
The assumption is somewhat justified by the
aforementioned share position limit on clients
and because we’re trading a stock (MSFT)
with high Island liquidity. Other valuation
methods are possible, however, and we might
explore them in future competitions.
The three competitions took place during
November to December 2002, February to
March 2003, and April to May 2003. In each
competition, we divided the client strategies
into pools, both for the sake of population
diversity and to reduce each simulation’s
computational load. The first two competi-
tions placed no restrictions on clients other
than the share position limit, and we deter-
mined the winners strictly by their cumula-
tive profitability. We won’t discuss these
early competitions’ results in detail here, but
one chief lesson we learned was that addi-
tional rules or scoring criteria were desirable
to encourage increased realism among clients.
This led to the third competition, dubbed the
Platinum Platter Competition.
PPC 2003 divided the 14 entrant strategies
into a Blue and a Red pool, each with seven
clients. The division was somewhat arbitrary
but took into account coarse preliminary
experiments to ensure that each pool had a
reasonable amount of client liquidity.
The competition occurred on each of the
10 trading days of the weeks of 28 April and
5 May. Each day’s PXS simulation ran from
9:30 am to 4 pm, the normal NASDAQ trading
hours. (Although Island conducts after-hours
trading, the liquidity tends to be considerably
lower than during normal exchange hours.)
While daily and overall profitability naturally
remained important components of client
evaluation, we used an interesting and con-
siderably richer set of scoring criteria (see
Figure 2) to encourage client realism and
good trading practices.
The strategies
Table 1 briefly describes each PPC 2003
client and indicates its pool and its overall
final pool ranking according to the scoring
criteria in Figure 2. Many participants inves-
tigated variants of the Static Order Book
Imbalance (SOBI) client that we provided
for them. This client attempts to predict price
movement on the basis of volume and price
imbalances between the buy and sell order
books.
One theme that emerged was how trading
clients exploited order book information. Not
only does PXS itself use Island and internal
order books to conduct its simulations, it also
makes its books available to trading clients
in real time, thus permitting strategies that
attempt to derive predictive or other value
from this information. The interest in, and
challenge of, consistently and profitably
exploiting order book data in our project mir-
rors similar interest on Wall Street. The
clients CBR-SOBI and CReaTiv heavily
used order book behavior and statistics. Two
clients applied machine learning techniques
to feature vectors derived from order books;
CBR-SOBI used case-based reasoning, and
CIA used the classification learning algo-
rithm called boosting. Overall, nine of the 14
entrants exploited order book data; however,
the centrality of this data to the strategy var-
ied considerably.
Several clients, such as MoneyFlow,
OBCrossover, and OBBreakout, imple-
mented variations on more traditional tech-
nical trading strategies. OBMM, DAMM-
STAT, and RapidMM implemented some
form of market-making strategy, which seeks
to profit from price volatility rather than
overall movement.
Overall, the entrants formed two diverse
pools of interesting strategies, varying from
the extremely simple (such as Contrarian) to
the rather complex. They exhibited a range
of trading styles that includes both those
commonly found on Wall Street, such as
market-making and certain technical trading
methods, and rather new (and untested)
methods, such as those relying heavily on
order book data. We have deliberately
encouraged this diversity throughout the proj-
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ect, believing it increases the simulations’
interest and realism. Of course, PPC 2003’s
results depend strongly on the particular set
of clients and even on the specific division
into pools, as you’ll see.
The results
Table 2 summarizes each client’s overall
performance. The table sorts clients by their
pool and their final ranking according to the
scoring criteria of Figure 2. In addition to
listing the overall point totals that determined
the final standings, the table lists subtotals
for each point category.
The PPC 2003 winners were CBR-SOBI
(Blue pool) and DAMM-STAT (Red pool).
It’s striking how differently each strategy
managed to emerge as the victor in its respec-
tive pool. CBR-SOBI was also among the top
performers in terms of raw profitability (dis-
cussed shortly) and earned most of its points
in categories directly related to positive earn-
ings. DAMM-STAT was barely profitable
overall but succeeded by consistent adher-
ence to good trading practices. It managed
to earn the maximum of 20 points for risk
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Table 1. 2003 Platinum Platter Competition clients.
Client Description Performance
CBR-SOBI Case-based reasoning applied to the Static Order Book First in the Blue pool; statistically significant profitability
Imbalance strategy’s parameters
MoneyFlow A predictive strategy using money flow (price movement times Second in the Blue pool
volume traded) as a trend indicator
OBMM A market-maker that positions orders in front of the nth orders Third in the Blue pool
on both books
CReaTiv Capitalization on Real Time Volatility—SOBI modified by recent Fourth in the Blue pool
volatility
OBCrossover Exponential Moving Average crossover strategy moderated by Tied for fifth in the Blue pool
confirmation of order book quartile volume-weighted average prices
OBBreakout A breakout strategy applied to trend lines on the volume-weighted Tied for fifth in the Blue pool
average prices of buy and sell books
RaSTa Resistance and Support Trading Agent—computes support and Seventh in the Blue pool
resistance levels on the basis of peaks in the order book volume
DAMM-STAT A Mixture of a Dynamically Adjusted Market-Maker that calibrates First in the Red pool; stellar position management
by recent volatility and a trend-based predictive strategy
Contrarian Sells on rising prices, buys on falling prices Second in the Red pool
OBSigma Trades on the basis of relative spreads in the buy and sell books, Third in the Red pool
interpreting a small standard deviation as a sign of confidence
OBVol A simple predictive strategy using total volumes in buy and Fourth in the Red pool; highest Sharpe ratio and statistically 
sell books significant profitability
RapidMM A market-maker with rapid revision of quotes based on the Fifth in the Red pool
current inside market
CIA Central Intelligent Agent—a predictive strategy applying boosting Sixth in the Red pool
to order book snapshots
SimpleTrend A simple trend prediction strategy Seventh in the Red pool; statistically significant negative earnings
Figure 2. The client scoring criteria for the 2003 Platinum Platter Competition.
Criteria emphasizing profitability
• Daily profit and loss. On a daily basis, award 3 points to each client whose end-of-day P&L
is highest in its seven-client pool; 2 points to the second highest; 1 point to the third
highest. Maximum possible award: 30 (3 × 10) points.
• Overall consistency of P&L. A one-time award of 15 points goes to any client that has a
positive cumulative P&L over the competition’s 10 trading days and that ends with a
negative daily P&L on three trading days at most. Maximum possible award: 15 points.
Criteria emphasizing robustness, with weak profitability prerequisites
• Daily intraday position reversals. On a daily basis, award 2 points to any client that finishes
with a positive P&L for the trading day and that held share positions in excess of 10,000
shares in both the long and short direction at some point during the day. Maximum
possible award: 20 (2 × 10) points.
• Robustness to market variation. Award 5 points to each client that has a positive P&L on
any pair of trading days in which the share price rose overall (open to close) on one day of
the pair and fell on the other. For each additional such pair, award an additional 5 points.
Maximum possible award: 25 (5 × 5) points, if exactly 5 up days and 5 down days for the
stock occur during the competition.
Criteria emphasizing good trading practices, with no profitability prerequisites
• Daily risk saturation. On a daily basis, award 2 points to each client that achieves a share
position in excess of 50,000 shares (long or short) at some point during the trading day,
without exceeding the maximum-allowed share position of 100,000 shares. Alternatively,
award 2 points to clients whose total matched volume of shares for the trading day exceeds
1/14 (one-half of the per-client average of 1/7) of the total matched volume of all clients.
Maximum possible award: 20 (2 × 10) points.
• Daily position unwinding. On a daily basis, any client that’s awarded that day’s risk saturation
points can earn an additional 2 points by ending the trading day with a share position of
fewer than 5,000 shares (long or short). Maximum possible award: 20 (2 × 10) points.
saturation and earned 14 points for unwind-
ing (that is, returning to zero) its position on
seven of the 10 days. The next best perfor-
mance in unwinding in either pool earned
only six points. Overall, we were quite
pleased with the balance between profitabil-
ity, consistency, and good trading practices
that the scoring criteria brought out among
the better performers. Although many of the
lower-ranked clients had positive earnings,
they all consistently failed in one or more of
the basic practices or behaviors we encour-
aged.
In terms of profitability, 11 of the 14
clients ended with overall positive cumula-
tive earnings for the 10-day competition. Of
course, just as on Wall Street, we must con-
sider the question of both the statistical sig-
nificance of earnings and the trade-off
between risk and return. A common measure
of the latter is known as the Sharpe ratio,
which is the empirical daily average of
returns divided by the standard deviation.
The ideal is to have a large Sharpe ratio—
consistently high earnings with a very small
spread in the returns. Among the 14 clients,
two (CBR-SOBI and OBVol) achieved note-
worthy Sharpe ratios, and one (SimpleTrend)
actually displayed a strongly negative Sharpe
ratio. Despite OBVol’s strong monetary per-
formance, it fared worse by the scoring cri-
teria. Its poor score was due primarily to a
consistent failure to saturate the allowed risk
compared to the higher-ranked clients, which
all received all 20 points in this category. (For
simplicity, the Sharpe ratios given simply
took the 10-day profit and loss figures divided
by their standard deviation, as opposed to the
more standard annualized values.)
Although the Sharpe ratio accounts for the
risk-return trade-off, it’s insensitive to the
amount of data available, so it’s generally an
unreliable indicator of statistical significance.
We thus also provide 95 percent confidence
intervals around each client’s average. By
this measure, two clients (CBR-SOBI and
OBVol again) had confidence intervals lying
exclusively in the region of positive earnings.
They thus pass this standard test for statisti-
cal significance at the 0.05 level on just 10
days of data. By the same token, we can
assert with high confidence that SimpleTrend
is a money-losing strategy.
Overall, the PPC 2003 scoring criteria
seemed to effectively balance profitability
considerations with our other interests. More
precisely, the correlation coefficient between
the clients’ point totals and their profit and
loss totals was 0.41; so, profitability was con-
siderably important but not dominant. This
isn’t surprising, considering the motivation
behind the criteria’s design.
Analysis
Recall that a main motivation behind the
design of PXS and the competition is to cre-
ate a hybrid market in which an incoming
stream of real market data can influence or
“correct” a diverse market of virtual clients.
We’re thus naturally interested in examining
the extent to which the internal PXS market
correlated with or deviated from the Island
market. Overall, the competition seems to
have quite successfully balanced the virtual
and external markets’ influences. A typical
plot of the PXS and Island last prices gener-
ally shows that over the entire trading day,
the two prices were extremely close, with
occasional small short-term deviations (we
discuss some notable exceptions to this later).
More quantitatively, Figure 3a illustrates
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Table 2. PPC 2003 results.
Points for
95% 10-day
Avg. confidence Shape
Strategy Pool Rank P&L ($) interval ratio
CBR-SOBI Blue 1 74 9 18 2 10 15 20 4,187 ± 3,733 0.70
MoneyFlow Blue 2 69 15 20 0 4 15 15 2,007 ± 15,692 0.08
OBMM Blue 3 46 8 20 0 8 0 10 258 ± 7,909 0.02
CReaTiv Blue 4 42 7 20 0 10 0 5 (2,410) ± 6,770 (0.22)
OBCrossover Blue 5 33 6 6 0 6 0 15 3,242 ± 4,220 0.45
OBBreakout Blue 5 33 10 18 0 0 0 5 3,680 ± 7,963 0.29
RaSTa Blue 7 21 5 2 0 4 0 10 1,182 ± 2,441 0.30
DAMM-STAT Red 1 65 6 20 14 10 0 15 685 ± 5,195 0.08
Contrarian Red 2 55 6 20 2 12 0 15 2,022 ± 3,658 0.34
OBSigma Red 3 54 8 20 6 10 0 10 1,649 ± 2,382 0.43
OBVol Red 4 53 14 0 0 4 15 20 4,037 ± 1,900 1.32
RapidMM Red 5 50 10 20 0 10 0 10 3,649 ± 9,121 0.25
CIA Red 6 30 13 12 0 0 0 5 (1,451) ± 9,822 (0.09)
SimpleTrend Red 7 27 3 20 2 2 0 0 (24,467) ± 17,974 (0.84)
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the differences between the Island and PXS
last prices for the Blue pool (results for the
Red pool are similar), aggregated over all 10
competition days. The greatest mass in these
histograms lies close to 0 cents, and virtually
all the mass is contained in a margin of ±3
cents. So, the Island data’s external influence
seems to have indeed caused a close, but not
perfect, correlation between the two markets.
The histograms’ symmetry around 0 indi-
cates that PXS deviations from the Island
price are unbiased, as you might expect.
Figures 3b and 3c illustrate the differences
between the PXS and Island bids and asks
(the inside market). Here we again see a close
correspondence, with the mass entirely con-
tained in a margin of ±3 cents. Now, how-
ever, the histograms are asymmetric: the PXS
bid was much more frequently above the
Island bid, and the PXS ask much more fre-
quently below the Island ask. In other words,
the PXS inside market was generally tighter
than Island’s, a sign of greater liquidity and
competition in the PXS market.
We now examine more client-specific
behaviors. Perhaps the easiest way to visu-
alize individual clients’ overall trading be-
havior is to examine their share positions
throughout the trading day. Figure 4 contains
a graph for each client in the Blue pool, with
each graph containing 10 curves showing the
number of shares (long or short) the client
held as a function of time over the 10 com-
petition days. The curves’ crowded nature
makes tracking a client’s precise position on
any single day difficult. However, we can
infer from these curves a great deal of macro-
scopic information about the client’s fre-
quency and volume of trading, the bias
toward long or short positions, and many
other properties.
For instance, in the Blue pool (we omit
detailed Red pool analysis), we see that the
victorious client CBR-SOBI tended to exe-
cute relatively large transactions at relatively
long intervals. This contrasts with clients
such as OBMM, whose positions increase or
decrease in much smaller increments but
much more frequently. We can also see CBR-
SOBI’s frequent reversal of position within a
trading day, and an overall balance between
long and short selling. OBBreakout, on the
other hand, seems incapable of anything but
overall short positions. The dark mass of
heavy trading activity by CReaTiv between
approximately 10 and 11 am each day is
probably at least partially, if not primarily,
responsible for the heavy increases in over-
all PXS volume that occurred about that time
in the Blue pool on several trading days.
The Red pool’s SimpleTrend deserves
special mention because its behavior nicely
demonstrates that an internal pool of diverse,
aggressive virtual clients can act as a proxy
for the market impact that excessively large
orders typically have in the real world.
Unlike the other clients in either pool, Sim-
pleTrend often engaged in sudden transac-
tions (both buying and selling) for close to
100,000 shares, as Figure 5 shows. These
large deals proved disastrous for Simple-
Trend and profitable for its trading partners,
because the huge orders ate deep into the
opposing book and left SimpleTrend with
progressively worse prices. (Recall that Sim-
pleTrend had the worst P&L performance
and actually passes a statistical significance
test for unprofitability.) Despite the previ-
ously discussed statistical closeness of the
Island and PXS markets, SimpleTrend’s
behavior caused the Red pool last price to
instantaneously deviate dramatically from
Island’s several times. For example, Figure
5 shows where large SimpleTrend orders
directly cause sudden changes in the PXS
price at three distinct moments during the
day. Figure 5 illustrates a typical day for
SimpleTrend, where several precipitous
tumbles deeper into the red are directly
aligned in time with the large position
changes.
Our small pool of virtual clients probably
deviates from typical Wall Street traders
(even automated ones) in the large volume
of trading they engage in. Nonetheless, we
were pleased overall with the PXS market’s
realism, liquidity, and tightness; the external
Island data’s healthy influence; the correc-
tive effects of the other virtual clients in the
case of SimpleTrend; and the client popula-
tion’s diversity.
The Penn-Lehman Automated TradingProject is a work in progress; we’re
actively planning extensions to all aspects of
the project. On the systems and platform
side, we’re enhancing the client API, improv-
ing the speed and robustness of the execution
engine’s internal algorithms, and designing a
Web-based GUI that will permit remote par-
ticipants to use PXS and join our competi-
tions. On the strategy side, we’re using PXS
to investigate a range of order-book-based
trading algorithms.
We actively solicit external participation
in the project from researchers in both aca-
demic and industrial settings. If you’re inter-
ested, contact Michael Kearns at mkearns@
cis.upenn.edu.
Acknowledgments
Berk Kapicioglu and Byoungjoon Kim initially
developed and tested the Penn Exchange Simula-
tor, and Narayanan Mahesh, Nick Montfort, and
Rashid Tuweiq made numerous contributions to
the system. The Proprietary Trading Group at
Lehman Brothers in New York City gave generous
scientific, professional, and financial support to
the project. Michael Kearns especially thanks his
Lehman colleagues Michael Bleich, Michael Bos,
(a) (c)(b)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
Price difference
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
Price difference
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
Price difference
Figure 3. The differences between the PXS and Island markets for the Blue pool, aggregated over the 10 competition days: (a) last
prices; (b) bids; (c) asks.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2003 www.computer.org/intelligent 29
–100,000
–80,000
–60,000
–40,000
–20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
–100,000
–80,000
–60,000
–40,000
–20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
CBR-SOBI
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
MoneyFlow
–100,000
–80,000
–60,000
–40,000
–20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
OBMM
–100,000
–50,000
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
CReaTiv
–150,000
–100,000
–50,000
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
OBCrossover
–100,000
–90,000
–80,000
–70,000
–60,000
–50,000
–40,000
–30,000
–20,000
–10,000
0
10,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
OBBreakout
–60,000
–50,000
–40,000
–30,000
–20,000
–10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
RaSTa
Time
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
No
. o
f s
ha
re
s
Time
Time
Time Time
Time
Time
Figure 4. Blue pool client share positions over time (9:30 am to 4 pm). Each graph shows the number of shares a client owns or owes
as a function of time, with each curve corresponding to a day of the competition.
A g e n t s  a n d  M a r k e t s
30 www.computer.org/intelligent IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
Andy Ellner, Amy Papandreou, Colin Rust, and
Mark Sanborn for their time and knowledge. We
also thank all the participants in the Penn-Lehman
Automated Trading Project who developed PXS
clients for their hard work and patience. We’re par-
ticularly grateful for the suggestions and com-
ments of Yuriy Nevmyvaka of Carnegie Mellon
University and Peter Stone of the University of
Texas at Austin.
References
1. Proc. 4th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce,
ACM Press, 2003.
2. P. Stone et al., “ATTac-2000: An Adaptive
Autonomous Bidding Agent,” J. Artificial
Intelligence Research, vol. 15, Sept. 2001, pp.
189–206.
3. M. Wellman et al., “The 2001 Trading Agent
Competition,” Electronic Markets, vol. 13,
no. 1, 2003, pp. 4–12.
4. M. Wellman et al., “Designing the Market
Game for a Trading Agent Competition,”
IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 5, no. 2,
Mar./Apr. 2001, pp. 43–51.
5. J. Bouchaud, M. Mezard, and M. Potters, “Sta-
tistical Properties of Stock Order Books:
Empirical Results and Models,” Quantitative
Finance, vol. 2, no. 4,Aug. 2002, pp. 251–256.
6. J. Hasbrouck and G. Saar, Limit Orders and
Volatility in a Hybrid Market: The Island
ECN, working paper, Dept. of Finance, New
York Univ., 2002.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2003 www.computer.org/intelligent 31
–40,000
–35,000
–30,000
–25,000
–20,000
–15,000
–10,000
–5,000
0
5,000
10,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Do
lla
rs
Time
Island present value
Simulator present value
–100,000
–80,000
–60,000
–40,000
–20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Nu
m
be
r o
f s
ha
re
s
Time
Share position
25.7
25.8
25.9
26.0
26.1
26.2
26.3
26.4
26.5
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Do
lla
rs
Time
Island last price
Simulator last price
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 5. The client SimpleTrends’ behavior for 9 May: (a) profit and loss; (b) share
position; (c) share price. Three trades exceeding 60,000 shares each (a sell shortly after 
10 am, a sell around 1 pm, and a buy around 3 pm) are each accompanied by sharp losses
because the large orders eat deep into the PXS order books. Although the last prices are
indistinguishably close for almost the entire day, the first and last of SimpleTrend’s large
trades cause instantaneous, large deviations of the PXS price in the corresponding 
direction. At the large trade around 1 pm, the PXS books apparently had enough depth
near the inside market to absorb the trade and prevent a deviation between the Island
and PXS prices.
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